

REORGANIZING THE GENERATING FORCE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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This paper will argue that the current Generating Force definition is too broad in scope and the Generating Force itself should be restructured. In addition to the current terms of Operational Army (OA) and Generating Force (GF), the Army should create a category for Supporting Force (SF) and establish the Trainees Transient Holders Students (TTHS) account as a separate category. The TTHS category should also be utilized by the entire RC, to include the Army National Guard (ARNG). By creating these additional categories the Army will improve clarity of the Army's organizational structure, assist with resourcing prioritization of the Operational Army, increase TTHS visibility across all components, and potentially decrease resource costs through greater visibility across all components. Regardless of the current functions of law which segregate AC and RC, these changes should be implemented in anticipation of further and continued funding constraints.

REORGANIZING THE GENERATING FORCE

The Army is currently divided into two broad forces: the Generating Force previously known as the Institutional Army, and the Operational Army. This division of the Army force structure has occurred due to the nature of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (now termed Overseas Contingent Operations (OCO)).¹ In response to pressures on current and potential future combat operations by the Operational Army's force structure, the Army developed the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The ARFORGEN model applies to the active Army and the Reserve Component (RC), driving the RC's transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. Complicating these changes, the Army has not adequately defined the Generating Force's missions, roles, and functions in support of the Operating Force. This paper will argue that the current Generating Force definition is too broad in scope and the Generating Force itself should be restructured. In addition to the current terms of Operational Army (OA) and Generating Force (GF), the Army should create a category for Supporting Force (SF) and establish the Trainees Transient Holders Students (TTHS) account as a separate category. The TTHS category should also be utilized by the entire RC, to include the Army National Guard (ARNG). By creating these additional categories the Army will:

- Improve clarity of the Army's organizational structure and primary focus.
- Assist with resourcing prioritization of the Operational Army
- Increase TTHS visibility across all components
- Potentially decrease resource costs through greater visibility across all components.

The Generating Force definition should be narrowed to focus only on training functions in direct support of the Operational Army. Other Generating Force Military structures and commands which do not focus strictly on training and support of the Operational Army should be reclassified into a new component, the Supporting Force (SF). In addition to further clarification of the Generating Force, the Army should determine how to best employ the Generating Force. Such recommendations should include:

- Standardization of the Generating Force across Army components including equipment and personnel
- Consideration of consolidation of all Generating Force elements under command of a single Army command

Refinement of the Generating Force definition is critical to the Army as the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and the Army National Guard (ARNG) currently total over 50% of the total Army and have structured their Generating Forces differently than the Army. These differences in Generating Force structure do not meet the Army's needs to release critical manpower resources to fill Operational Army structures, impose a large financial cost to the Army, impair flexibility and responsiveness across the full spectrum of operations and, due to duplication of effort, reduce maximum efficiency and effectiveness of training and support to the total force.

Definition of Key Terms and Concepts:

Total Army Composition. The Total Army is comprised of the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). The RC includes both the USAR and ARNG. Utilizing current reports,

from the Total Army Personnel Database (TAPDB) the current Army's end strength composition in December 2009 is shown in table 1:

	AC	USAR	ARNG.
Total Strength	556,682	206,965	358,127
Total Strength Army 2009	1,121,774		

Table 1 End Strength Composition

Operational Army. FM 1-01 states the Operational Army is: "Those Army organizations whose primary purpose is to participate in the full spectrum operations as part of the joint force."² FM1-01 also uses the Joint publication (JP1-02) term of Operating Force and states: "(joint) those forces whose primary mission are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof."³ This definition is often misused and misinterpreted in many documents in describing the Operational Army. For example, in the Total Army Analysis Process for FY 2017 (TAA 12-17) the Army G3/5/7 clearly describes Operating Force as a separate entity within the total Army.⁴ Until there is a change in definitional terms and clarity in the use of definition, this paper will not utilize the Joint publication term of Operating Force, but will use the term Operational Army.

ARFORGEN. According to the 2009 Army posture statement:

ARFORGEN allows the Army to meet strategic requirements, prepare for full spectrum operations, and preserve the all volunteer force for today and the future. In 2006, the Army established a rotational readiness model, called Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), which is designed to effectively and efficiently generate trained and ready forces from combatant commanders sustainable rotational levels for our forces. It is also designed to provide ready contingency forces.⁵

This model allows for rotation of both AC and RC component units in a manageable timeframe, objectively one year deployment for two years on station for AC and one year deployment for five years home station for RC, which allows for continued presence of forces for operations and the rapid reset of returning deployed units to operational status. First discussed in 2004, the ARFORGEN model was initially implemented in 2006, but will take until 2011 to reach full maturity; until then, rotational cycles for both AC and RC will continue to be compressed, resulting in additional stress on the entire Army structure. Army concept plans for transformation and implementation of the Generating Force and Operational Army structures were designed and integrated to support the ARFORGEN model but under current implementation do not meet full mission requirements of the ARFORGEN goal for deployment cycles for either AC or RC components.

TTHS Account. There is much debate about the Trainees Transients Holders Students (TTHS) account in the Army, especially its size and the impact of these numbers on overall force structure. How to manage and quickly move soldiers through TTHS and move them back to the Operational Army remains a high priority.

In an Association of the United State Army (AUSA) Landpower Essay published November 2004 Major Scott T. Nestler a Force Structure Analyst in the Army G1 Plans Division, writes:

TTHS often is viewed in a negative light and seen as the reason the Army cannot have more units for structure. Although this is technically true, it may be more appropriate to consider TTHS as the investment required for the Army to have trained and educated leaders Soldiers ready and available to perform their missions. The Army uses the term TTHS to represent soldiers not assigned to units.⁶

Until very recently, the ARNG did not maintain a TTHS account. However, a National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) Legislative Update dated August 14, 2009 noted that it is highly likely that this account will be created quickly, in an effort for standardization and visibility.

The status for a TTHS account in the ARNG is in both the House and Senate passed versions of the FY10 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 2647 and S. 1390 respectively, contain a provision intended to address the Army National Guard's end strength. Section 416 in both bills requires the Army to complete a study on the creation of a Trainee, Transients, Holders and Students (TTHS) account within the Army Guard.⁷

The TTHS issue adds more confusion to the definition of Generating Force. As previously discussed, TTHS soldiers currently are not assigned to the Operating Army and by default are assigned to the Generating Force. November 2009 statistics state the TTHS is 90,679 soldiers or 12.83% of the 1,121,774 personnel within the total Army strength, but there is poor visibility of this number as it is usually included in the total Generating Force numbers. Adding the TTHS numbers to the current GF population of 188,913 results in a total of 279,592; almost 25% of the Army is in both accounts. Separating the TTHS account from the Generating Force and establishing it as a separate classification would resolve this issue and make it fully visible.

Institutional Army. The Army's definition of the Generating Force was first discussed back in 2005. Previous to that time, FM 1 defined the Army as consisting of two major components, the Operational Army and the Institutional Army. According to FM 1 (June 2005):

The institutional Army exists to support accomplishing the Army's Title 10 functions. Institutional organizations provide the foundation necessary to design, raise, train, equip, buy, sustain, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. For example, institutional organization includes the training base that provides military skill development and professional education

soldiers, members of other services, and multinational stands. The institutional Army, soldier training centers, and combat training centers to develop and maintain individual and collective skills. These centers and schools also provide doctrine, research, and learning activities of the Army's professional knowledge base.⁸

Generating Force. There is much similarity between these definitions and the current definition of the Generating Force. FM 1 continues with this definition:

The Institutional Army provides the infrastructure and capabilities needed to rapidly expand the Army and deployed forces. It synchronizes Army acquisition and force development efforts with the national industrial capabilities and resources needed to provide equipment, logistics, and services. It also manages reach back resources, capabilities at home station that deployed unit access to support their operations. These include everything from databases and staff support to contracted services. Reach back capabilities reduce strategic with requirements in the size of in theater logistical operations (the "footprint"). The institutional Army provides vital support to joint campaign and Army operations.⁹

The Generating Force definition in the April 2008 FM 1-01 states the primary mission of the Force is to generate and sustain operational Army capabilities.¹⁰ With this definition, the Army only changed the previously labeled Institutional Army into the Generating Force. Additionally this term is inclusive of AC and RC components and the TTHS account. It is critical to remember the entire Generating Force is currently 25% of the Army and many senior leaders are questioning its size and want to know how it can be reduced to allow for ARFORGEN cycles to be extended to meet stated goals. Across all three components, AC, RC, and ARNG, a reduction of the GF including TTHS account to fill personnel shortages in Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and Multi-Functional Brigades (MFB) will help meet the goal for longer dwell time between rotation cycles. Table 2 reflects recent Generating Force disposition across the Army.

	AC	USAR	ARNG.
Total Strength	556,682	206,965	358,127
Generating Force	95,316	52,375	41,222
Generating Force Percentage			
By component	17%	25%	12%
TTHS	73,058	17,621	0
TTHS % by component	13%	9%	0%
Total Strength Operational Army		1,121,774	
Total Generating Force including TTHS	GF = 188,913 TTHS= 90,679		
Total	=279,592		
Percentage of total Generating Force		25%	
Including both generating forces and TTHS			

Table 2 Generating Force across the Army:

Issues and Background of the Generating Force

The current Generating Force includes a broad array of commands and organizations which train the Operational Army for deployment. The AC and RC maintain Generating Force units which are substantially different from the AC. As a result, the Army has duplication of Generating Force headquarters units and facilities for each component. This duplication of structure degrades the overall available strength of the Operational Army and consumes the precious resources in time, and soldiers.

The lack of specificity of the Generating Force term began with Army transformation in 2001 when Senior Army leadership realized the current and future conflicts would require total integration of all Army components in order to sustain the effort. The AC needed to transform its previous structure, including the RC into

Operational Army and Generating Forces to support the ARFORGEN cycle. As explained in the 2007 Army Posture Statement;

The Army is adapting the Generating Force to support ARFORGEN. The Generating Force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the Operational Force capabilities for employment by joint forces commanders. Because it performs functions specified in implied by law, the Generating Force also possesses capabilities for employment by, or in direct support, of joint force commanders. The enhancement of Generating Force capabilities is a critical component of Army transformation.¹¹

As the Army transitions to the ARFORGEN model, it is challenged to have enough trained soldiers to meet current conflicts and other operational requirements. Finally, due to the complexity of the current Generating Force structure this duplication directly impacts and impairs the responsiveness of the Army if additional conflicts arise. Title 10 authority also lists the functions and roles of the Generating Force and provides for multiple missions, according to FM1-01. The Generating Force can perform its title 10 functions by generating and sustaining the Operational Army or by directly supporting ongoing operations. However, in each case the Generating Force provides the capabilities under a different set of conditions.¹²

The Army 2009 posture statement addresses updates to the Generating Force structure by stating in an online appendix:

What has the Army done?

The manual provides leaders with fundamental definitions in identifying the generating Force operational capabilities and principles, thus making it the keystone manual for the employment of the Generating Force capabilities in support of operations.

Work continued efforts to the Army have planned for the future?

The next steps include developing a The Generating Force concept for the Future Force in codifying doctrine as appropriate and standard operating procedures and manuals. The concept will serve to better prepare,

support, and sustain the future operational Army in full spectrum operations in the doctrine will support seamless and timely transition of the Generating Force capabilities from the routine, peacetime function is to direct support of operating forces as well as support of domestic security engagements.¹³

Even with continued updating of the Army posture statements, the definition has not changed for the Generating Force. Dual missions remain as the Generating Force also provides enablers to the Army, which further degrades the Generating Forces' capabilities.

However, this transformation of the total Army structure not gone far enough. Simply renaming the Institutional Army to the Generating Force and not changing its basic roles and functions continues to create inefficiency within the total force. The combined role of training and support in a single structure is too cumbersome for management of the Generating Force and its support of the ARFORGEN cycle. Narrowing the focus of the Generating Force to a training role in direct support of the Operational Army will ensure a better end state. This is critical in helping the Army determine whether to increase or decrease the size of the Generating Force in support of the Operational Army. Identifying the proper size of a Generating Force with a direct support training role will help identify greater effectiveness and efficiencies in the system. Nesting this concept in support of the ARFORGEN cycle, TRADOC becomes the most important proponent within the Generating Force.

Current AC Generating Forces Structure in the Army

FM1-01 Major commands of the Army Generating Force are listed in table 3.¹⁴

Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)
 Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)
 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
 U.S. Army Material Command (USAMC)
 U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army)
 (NETCOM/9th SC(A))
 U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM)
 Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
 Military District of Washington (MDW)
 U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC)
 U.S. Military Academy (USMA)
 U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM)
 Headquarters, US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC)
 U.S. Army Core of Engineers (USACE)

Table 3 Army Generating Force

Many of these commands which are currently in the Generating Force do not have a direct role in the training of the Operational Army. These commands have a supporting role and should be considered a Support Force (SF). The same criteria in determining size and criticality of the SF positions for expansion or reduction within the Army can more clearly be evaluated

FM1-01 lists many Title 10 functions of the Generating Force, these functions are but not exhaustive are described in table 4.¹⁵

Recruiting	Organizing	Supplying
Equipping (including research and development)		
Training	Servicing	Mobilizing
Demobilizing		
Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)		
Maintaining		
Constructing, outfitting, and repairing military equipment		
Constructing, maintaining, and repairing buildings, structures, and utilities, and acquiring real property and interest in real property necessary to carry out responsibilities specified in this section		

Table 4 Functions of the Generating Force

Authority and Structure

Army Regulation (AR) 10-87, Army Command, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, clearly stipulates the missions and functions of each of the commands listed in the Generating Force. Only three commands concentrate on training the force: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) and U.S. Military Academy (USMA). However as mentioned previously, TTHS and all other commands not specifically tasked with training should not included in the Generating Force. This definitional change would reduce and clarify the number of trainers in the AC component specifically supporting the Operational Army. Creating the category of a Support Force and further separating these commands would allow a clearer picture of each organization's roles. The Army could then determine with greater precision which commands have a viable role in the future, when further structural change is required.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

The mission statement for TRADOC reads: “TRADOC recruits, trains, and educates the Army's soldiers; develops leaders; supports training and units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future army.”¹⁶ It is the primary Army command responsible for training and education. TRADOC oversees both the AC and RC components and performs accreditation for meeting educational requirements. It delegates this duty through the system called the Army school system (TASS).

TRADOC regulation 350 - 18 states:

Commanding General (CG), TRADOC serves as the Army executive agent for TASS and its accreditation. CG, TRADOC will establish, develop, and provide training programs, instructional support materials, education, and criteria for course standardization and accreditation standards for. Enforce requirement for functional alignment of TASS training Battalions with TRADOC proponent schools.¹⁷

The Army School System (TASS) AC and RC

TRADOC regulation 350-18 defines the TASS system and the Army components subject to the system.

TASS is a composite school system made up of Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army reserve (USAR), and active Army (AA) institutional training systems. TASS conducts initial military training, reclassification training, officer, warrant officer (WO), noncommissioned officer (NCO) and Department of the Army (DA) civilian professional development training and education and functional training. Training is accomplished through both standard resident and distributed-learning courses.¹⁸

AR 350-1 Army Training outlines The Army School System (TASS) and expands the definition listed.

TASS is a composite school system made up of AA, ARNG, USAR, and Army civilian institutional training systems. TASS conducts initial military training (for example, basic combat training (BCT), AIT), Basic Officer Leadership Courses (BOLC I, II, III); reclassification training (for example, MOS and officer branch qualification); officer, warrant officer, NCO and Army civilian professional development training and education (for

example, Officer Education System (OES), Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and Civilian Education System (CES)); and functional training (for example, ASI, SQI, SI, LIC). This is accomplished through both standard resident and distributed-learning courses. The RC TASS units are functionally aligned and linked to appropriate training proponents.¹⁹

TRADOC regulation 350-18 outlines and establishes: TASS training regiments (REGTS) / brigades (BDEs); functional alignment of the organization is also provided in the regulation.²⁰ This regulation provides the basis and requirements for the RC component to train its own force structure. Additionally, AR 10-87 provides the following authority to United States Army Reserve Command (USARC): USARC provides trained and ready units and qualified Soldiers that are prepared to mobilize and support the armed services during time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as security may require filling the needs of the Armed Forces.²¹

Finally, the Army Training and Leader Development regulation AR 350-1 states: the Army training proponents (for example, TRADOC, USASOC, US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), ARNG/ARNGUS, and the USAR) provide the structure to establish, maintain, and operate the TASS education system with a common automated management system.²²

The Army has clearly established training as a priority at all levels- both individual and collective training readiness is a critical component of readiness. All levels of training from initial entry training (IET) to the Army senior service schools (SSS) are essential and required for operational readiness and promotions. TASS is a multi component training system and delivery vehicle for this education and TRADOC is the command proponent. TASS delivery of training is diversified, with traditional classroom training and computerized distance learning education programs. Instructors from the

active Army, USAR and civilians support the overall classroom structure. Due to this design it is difficult to determine which component of the Army TASS provides the instructor support base. The combination of the current TASS system and the current definition of the Generating Force still fail to provide clarity of how many soldiers are specifically considered trainers in the Operational Army. Within the current Generating Force there are too many units which are not part of the TASS system which raises concern for the Army. A large component of the TTHS account is considered unavailable for operational deployment as they are attending required schools in the TASS system.

Using training as the primary mission for the Generating Force it becomes evident TASS covers across all three Army components and there is duplication at multiple levels. A standardization of the educational system within TASS and identification of all certified instructors through TRADOC would reduce duplication of effort and maximize efficiency of training to the TTHS account. Currently some parts of TASS are replicated and need to be addressed. According to a study conducted by Rand conducted over a two year time frame from 1996 almost a third of the RC training slots went unfilled.²³ Much of the problem with these unfilled positions was primarily a combination of cancelation of quotas and a lack of reservations to fill available seats. Additionally, class duplication, alternate schools, or the uses of other methodologies for education contributed to over allocation of slots for training. Finally, command climate issues and soldier availability to attend training impacted effective delivery of training. This finding clearly demonstrates a waste of Army resources at multiple levels. Further

discussion of TASS will be limited to direct support of the Generating Force structure; an analysis on potential restructure of TASS is beyond the scope of this paper.

Current TASS school systems are listed in Table 5.²⁴

US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
The Judge Advocate Generals Legal Center and School
Civilian Personnel Operations
US Army Medical Department and School
US Army Management Staff School
US Army Force Management School
US Army Corps of Engineers
Department of the Army Inspector General
US Army Criminal Investigation Command
US Army Material Command Schools
US Military Academy

Table 5 Active Component Proponent Schools

RC proponent schools are listed in table 6.²⁵

ARNG									
Leadership and Professional Development									
OCS	NCOA		WOCS	MFTU					
Combat Arms									
INF	MTN	WFR	Sniper	AD	AR	AV	EN	FA	WTC
Combat Support									
MI	MP (31B1)	IO	CSS	TC (88M1)	OD	HS (91W-T)			
USAR									
Leadership and Professional Development									
OES	NCOA		MFTU						
Combat Support									
EN	SC	IO	MP	MI	CM	CA	PO		
Combat Service Support									
PS	QM	TC	OD	HS					

Table 6 Reserve Component Proponent Schools

RC Generating Force Structure

The RC generating force structure consists of two components, USAR and the ARNG. Both utilize the TASS system for registering students for education purposes. With all three Army components utilizing the TASS system under TRADOC control an expectation of standardization and efficiency of delivery methods is not unreasonable; however, in many cases there is duplication of effort which reduces both efficiency and effect of the educational process within the Generating Force. An example is Officer Training programs; the ARNG maintains Officer Candidate School courses separate from either the standard Reserve Officer Training Corps or other Army Officer Candidate Schools. Additionally, almost 33% of the available training positions within the TASS system went unfilled because of factors including duplicate schools, command concerns and availability of soldiers to attend. Consolidation of the Generation Force between the USAR and ARNG is required to minimize wasted resources.

USAR Generating Force

The USAR, in addition to its combat service support role, has a large educational role for the RC. Almost 25% (52,375 of 206,965 soldiers) of its members are considered part of the USAR Generating Force. This does not include an additional 17, 621 soldiers currently in the TTHS account as of December 2009. Because the USAR Generating Force does not have the equivalent of the AC commands such as a US Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM), or US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), a higher percentage of its soldiers have training missions. Currently there are 23 units within the USAR which make up the training base.²⁶These

units educate AC, USAR, and ARNG through the TASS system under TRADOC. Many ARNG soldiers attend courses conducted and trained by USAR training elements.

USAR organizations in the Generating Force are listed in table 7.²⁷ These units specifically focus on required Army training for professional development. Courses taught include: Intermediate Level Education (ILE) formerly known as the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and three Noncommissioned Officer Academies.

108 th Training Command (Initial Entry Training) Charlotte, North Carolina
95 th DIV (IT) Oklahoma City OK
98 th Div (IT) Rockchester, New York
100 th Div (IT) Louisville, Kentucky
104 th Div (IT) Vancouver, Washington
78 th Div (TS) Edison, New Jersey
85 th Div (TS) Arlington Heights, Illinois
87 th Div (TS) Birmingham, Alabama
91 st Div (TS) Fort Baker, California
166 th Aviation Brigade Ft. Riley, Kansas
84 th Training Command (UR) Ft Knox, Kentucky
75 th Battle Command Training Division Houston, Texas
First Army Division East Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
Three NCOAs located at Ft Dix, New Jersey, Ft McCoy Wisconsin, and Ft Lewis Washington

Table 7 RC Generating Forces Organizations

These training organizations train the bulk of the RC component force. Recent guidance from the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) directed mission changes for these organizations through consolidation, creating additional Operational Army positions within the USAR. The 2009 USAR posture statement explains that the component is looking to build an effective and fully Operational Force; as of 2009 almost 16,000 positions have been identified and are in the process of being allocated to the Operating Force.²⁸

With its current high operational tempo, the Army is searching for more positions for the Operational Army in order to stabilize the ARFORGEN cycle for both for AC and RC components. To ensure the objective cycle of 1 to 2 year rotation for AC units and 1 to 5 year RC rotational cycle, these changes are critically important.

ARNG Generating Force

The ARNG maintains a Generating Force as well. Every state maintains a Regional Training Institute (RTI), which makes up the bulk of the ARNG GF. In addition to duplication of training for specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) courses, there is duplication as well in state level security courses. The proliferation of RTIs leads to duplication of effort, decreased effectiveness and efficiency and increased expenditure of funds otherwise needed for support of the Operational Army. Unlike the USAR which has consolidated units, each state maintains a discrete RTI Center as part of its training structure. An example of an RTI would be the Oklahoma Regional Training Institute (OKRTI) which supports military skill level training for field artillery personnel, Small-Group Instructor Training Courses (SGITC) and a variety of nonmilitary training.²⁹ The cost of maintaining, equipping, and standardization of all the RTI's should be evaluated to determine the true nation-wide

requirement for this training capability. Any new plans for construction of additional RTI centers must be evaluated against existing training capabilities in order to preclude development of any further excess training capability.

Issues to be Considered

Across the AC and RC there is reduced efficiency and redundant structures for training. Multiple courses are offered through TASS, yet there are many empty classroom seats in OCS, NCOES, and MOS schools. Redundancy and underutilized training capacity wastes resources, and reduces the Army's ability to maintain and fill the Operating For structure.

The effectiveness of the current system is also impaired by multiple training delivery systems and wide spread locations by different training proponents. Current education programs are delivered in traditional centralized classroom settings (AC Intermediate Level Education (ILE), Army War College (AWC)), small-group diversified settings in the case of the USAR and ARNG (ILE and MOS training) Department of Distance Education (DDE) and more recently by the Army Distributed Learning program (ADL). Of all these delivery methodologies DDE may become the most cost effective and efficient means to train the Operational Army, with the advent of greater technology and ability to conference. Due to the wide variation of delivery methods and duplication of training facilities, programs of instruction (POI's) result in different emphasis and results. There is a requirement for TRADOC to provide standardization for AC and RC training programs. For example, accreditation for the USAR ILE delivery method was conducted by Command and General School (C&GS) at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. In addition, the USAR C&GS program has been reporting to TRADOC for the last 18 months.

Due to current delivery methods, the redundant systems for providing training across the AC and RC reduce effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility in support to the Operational Army. This increased lack of flexibility and responsiveness directly impacts soldier readiness and impacts the greater Army's ability to undertake additional conflicts and fulfill other operational requirements.

Recommendations

1. Redefine the current Generating Force to consist only of training units in direct support of the Operational Army.
2. Create TTHS as a separate classification outside of the Generating Force
3. Create a Supporting Force classification.
4. Establish TRADOC as the primary Generating Force command with a mission to direct, execute, and supervise individual training to the Operational Army.
5. Establishment of a single component in direct support to TRADOC, either AC or RC, as the primary trainer for the Generating Force.
6. Examine the suitability of using other training methods such as expanded usage of DDE, ADL and utilization of current civilian education systems to perform selected elements of Army training.

Evaluation of Recommendations

Redefinition of the Generating Force will provide the Army with a clear picture of the current training structure in both AC and RC components. This will also address the current concerns about the size of the Generating Force. By establishing TRADOC as the commander of the Generating Force, both AC and RC greater effectiveness and efficiency should be realized.

Separation of the TTHS account from the Generating Force will provide the Army with clear visibility of the current non-available force within both the AC and RC. A command structure will be required for supervision and proactive management of the TTHS account. The ability to manage the educational rotation cycle in conjunction with the ARFORGN cycle is critical. Standardized procedures for both AC and RC will help establish and stabilize this population of soldiers. Greater effectiveness and efficiencies should be realized with proactive management and planning.

Creation of a Supporting Force. Many units currently considered Generating Force could be redefined as Supporting Force. The movement of all commands not in direct support to the training of the Operational Army would clarify availability of training resources. The separation of force structure from Generating force to Supporting Force will allow for visibility of potential assets to become available for support of operational needs.

Establishment of TRADOC as primary command with direct links to both AC and RC training structures would ensure standardized implementation of training changes and common evaluation standards. Under a single unified command structure a reduction of the duplication of effort and redundant structures within the AC and RC will provide greater efficiency and effectiveness.

The establishment of TRADOC in command of either the AC or the RC as the primary provider for the Generating Force will allow for a much greater reduction of duplication. Either the AC or RC would have this priority as a core competency for their current force structure. Such specialization would require changes in current law, Army regulations, and internal culture. However, in addition to the new definition of the

Generating Force, streamlining this system could potentially provide great benefits to the Army.

Current expansion of the Army DDE system could potentially reduce the size of the Generating Force. Expansion of emerging efforts and full inclusion of all available systems would enhance this delivery method. In addition to the expansion of the Army DDE system, partnerships with established civilian education proponents in conjunction with TRADOC, could also potentially result in additional training capabilities with less personnel costs to the Army.

Conclusion

The current Generating Force definition is too broad; it needs to be redefined to focus on organizations with a primary mission of individual training. Doing so will provide the Army with a greater visibility of what the actual Generating Force is in terms of strength, where it is located (either AC or RC) and its ability to focus on its core competencies of training in support of the Operational Army. The establishment of a Supporting Force and of a TTHS account will allow for both greater management and improved abilities to provide support to the ARFORGEN cycle. These recommendations will result in a reduction of duplication and improve effectiveness of individual training. Savings in time, funding, and resourcing of soldiers will be achieved. Implementation of these changes will cut across multi-components and the culture of each component. Regardless of the current functions of law which segregate AC and RC, these changes should be implemented in anticipation of further and continued funding constraints. Support to the current overseas contingency operations is likely to be required for the foreseeable future and the effective training of the force remains critical. Continued

deferral of any of these recommendations will continue to negatively impact the total Army's capacity to meet its current operational demands.

Endnotes

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